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CASES NOTED
In 1951 the Western District began to shift its position when it limited
the earlier statute' 5 to contracts made within the state.'8 In the instant
case, the same court was faced with new statutes which expressly extend the
right of direct action to policies written and delivered outside the state'
and require foreign insurers to consent to direct suit as the price of doing
business locally.' 8 The court held the "no action" clause a valuable property
right in that it (1) prevents exposure of a foreign insurer to a jury, and (2)
fosters cooperation by the insured in defending the action. Completely
reversing its former stand, the court held these laws to contravene the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 9 Although the districts are
thus harmonized, this opinion does not discuss the previous discord and
makes only perfunctory reference to cases controlling the Eastern District.
Instead, it stresses the exposure of foreign insurers to "all of the dangers of
bias and prejudice of which human nature is capable in determining both
liability and the amount of recovery.
' 20
The reasonableness of a jury award is an unusual test in determining
whether such a contract right has been unconstitutionally impaired, Does
the instant court mean to imply that the same contract right which is im-
paired because the suit was brought in federal court would have remained un-
impaired if the action had been brought in a state court? It is submitted
that the United States Supreme Court and Eastern District Court test, that
of inquiring whether the statute confers unwarranted extraterritoria.l power,
2'
is the sounder and more durable one.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - ELECTIONS - DISCRIMINATION
IN PARTY PRIMARIES
Plaintiffs sought to enjoin defendants from prohibiting Negroes from
voting in defendants' private political association primary which greatly
affected the subsequent state-regulated primary and general election. Held,
that where a state-regulated primary exists, a privatc political association is
not governed in its party prinmary by constitutional and statutory provisions
15. LA. REV. STAT. tit. 22 § 655 (1950).
16. Bayard v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 99 F. Stpp. 343 (V.D. La. 1951);
Recent Case, 65 HARLv. L. REV. 688 (1952).
17. LA. REV. STAT. tit. 22 § 655 (1950).
18. LA. REV. STAT. tit. 22 § 983 (1950).
19. U. S. CONsT. AMEND. XIV, § 1.
20. Bish v. Employers" Liability Assur. Corp. Ltd., 102 F. Supp. 343, 347 (W.D.
La. 1952).
21. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143
(1934); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken,
266 U.S. 389 (1924); Belanger v. Great American Indemnity Co. of N.Y., 89 F.
Supp. 736 (E.D. La. 1950); Wheat v. White, 38 F. Supp. 796 (E.D. La. 1941).
MIAMi LAW QUARTERLY
prohibiting such discrimination. Adams v. Terry, 193 F.2d 600 (5th Cir.
1952).
While the right to vote is granted by the state,' racial discrimination in
the granting of such rights is prohibited by the Fourteenth2 and Fifteenth
Amendments. 8 Early decisions established that racial discrimination in state-
regulated primaries was an invasion of constitutional rights.4 However, racial
discrimination in primaries of private political associations was not forbidden
-even where there were no state-regulated primaries. "  Today, in the ab-
sence of state regulation of primary elections, a political party which has a
definite impact on the final general election is held to perfoms the public
function of a state agency,6 and as such, it is subject to the restrictions con-
tained in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
The instant case is distinguished from past cases by the existence of a
state primary as well as a party primary. The issue is whether an effective
private political association is considered an agency of the state. Conflicting
views now exist. One, based upon underlying principles of past decisions,
declares an effective political party to be an agent of the state.' The instant
case expresses the contra view: that where a state-regulated primary exists,
wherein more than one party can actively participate, an effective political
association is considered as an individual and therefore not affected by the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
Based on the historical development of the electoral process, it is sub-
mitted that the better rule would declare an effective political party to be
an agency of the state.8 A political party once classified as a state agency
because of its effectiveness should not be permitted to revert to the status of
1. U.S. CoxsT. Art I1 § 1, United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875); see Mason
v. Missouri, 179 U.S. 328, 335 (1900); Mills v. Green, 67 Fed. 818, 829 (C.C.D.S.C.),
rev'd on other grounds, 69 Fed. 852 (C.C.D.S.C.), 159 U.S. 651 (1895); McPherson v.
Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 38 (1892); In re Green, 134 U.S. 377, 379 (1890); United States
v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 555-556 (1875); Fedesco v. Board of Supervisors of Elec-
tions, 46 So.2d 514 (La. App. 1949).
2. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Chapman v. King, 154 F.2d 460 (5th
Cir. 1946); see Joyner v. Browning, 30 F. Supp. 512, 517 (D. Tenn. 1939).
3. Meyers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1913); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370
(1880); Oregon-Wisconsin Timber Holding Co. v. Coos County, 71 Ore. 462, 142 Pac.
575 (1914).
4. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Nixon v. Condon, 49 F.2d 1012 (5th
Cir. 1931); Joyner v. Browning, 30 F. Stipp. 512 (D. Tenn. 1939).
5. Crovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935); Grisby v. Harris, 27 F.2d 942 (5th
Cir. 1928); Drake v. Executive Committee, 2 F. Supp. 486 (S.D. Tex. 1933); Robinson
%. 1-follman, 181 Ark. 428, 26 S.W.2d 66 (1930); Mason v. County Democratic Execn-
tve Committee of Dallas, 74 S.W.2d 326 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934); County Democratic
Executive Committee v. Booker, 53 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932); White v. Lub-
bock, 30 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
6. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (i9441; Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387 (4th
Cir. 1947); Brown v. Baskin, 78 F. Supp. 933 (E.D.S.C. 1948).
7. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387 (4th
Cir. 1947).
8. U.S. CoNsi'. Art. 1, §§ 2, 4 U.S. CONS'r. ANIENn. XIV, XV, XVII; Collins v.
Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (a state
cannot nullify its grant to the people by casting its electoral process in a form which per-
wits a private organization to practice racial discrimination in the election); United States
CASES NOTED
an individual solely because another state agency (state-regulated primary)
exists. If it is in fact an integral part of the state's election machinery, it is
in fact performing a function of the state and should be governed by the
provisions in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - SELF-INCRIMINATION
IMPLIED WAIVER
Appellants, as sureties for fugitives, appealed from a contempt citation
based upon their refusal to answer the court's questions concerning the
whereabouts of the fugitives. Held, that the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion was impliedly waived by voluntary assumption of the obligations of a
surety. United States v. Field, 193 F.2d 92 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 72 Sup.
Ct. 202 (1951).
The privilege against self-incrimination is recognized as a personal right.
It may be waived, but only by the individual concerned.' Wiginore indi-
cates that specific waiver of the privilege may be made by contract or other
binding pledge, and that such waiver becomes irrevocable.2 However, there
seems to be little support for this view:a Several English and American
courts have held such contracts against public policy and deemed the only
valid waiver to be voluntary testimony in open court.
In 1930, New York investigations impelled a movement to require a
specific waiver of the privilege as a prerequisite for holding certain public
offices. The state constitution outlines qualifications for such offices, and
the additional requirement was contested as an abridgement of the privi-
v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Meyers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915); Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1885) ("If a law fair on its face is applied with an evil eye to
make illegal discrimination between persons in circumstances material to their rights, it
is within the prohibition of the constitution"); Perry v. Cyphers, 186 F.2d 608 (5th Cir.
1951); Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947); White v. County Democratic
Executive Committee, 60 F.2d 973, 974 (5th Cir. 1932); Brown v. Baskin, 78 F. Supp.
933 (E.D.S.C. 1948); United States v. Malphurs, 46 F. Supp. 903 (SD. Fla. 1942); James
v. Marineship Corp., 25 Cal.2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1945) (constitutional provisions
against discrimination because of color evidence a definite national policy); Buttz v.
Marion Circuit Court, 225 Ind. 7, 72 N.W.2d 225 (1947); Allen v. Tobin, 155 Neb.
212, 51 N.W.2d 338 (1952); Application of Stillwell Political Club, 109 N.Y.S.2d 331
(1951); see County Democratic Executive Committee v. Booker, 53 S.W.2d 123, 125
(Tex. Civ. App. 1932) (dissent). But see Chapman v. King, 154 F.2d 460, 464 (5th Cir.
1946).
1. State v. Allison, 116 Mont. 352, 153 P.2d 141 (1944); McConnell v. State,
180 Okla. Crim. Rep. 688, 197 Pac. 521 (1921); Scribner v. State, 90 Okla. Crim. Rep.
465, 132 Pac. 933 (1913); 8 WIlMORE, EVIDENcE § 7a (3d ed. 1940) (waiver of rules
of evidence).
2. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2275 (3d ed. 1940).
3. See Note, Waiver of the Privilege Against Self-Incrirnination by Public Officers,
30 CoL. L. REV. 1160 (1930).
4. State v. Rockola, 339 II1. 474, 171 N.E. 559 (1930) (pre-trial agreement to
testify, though morally binding, cannot subject defendant to contempt proceedings if lie
claims the privilege); In re Sales, 134 Cal. App. 54, 24 P.2d 916 (1933); Lee v. Read,
5 Beav. 381 (18 42). Contra: United States v. Thomas, 42 F. Supp. 722 (D. Del, 1942).
